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which has little meaning in the absence of a fact situation, there is little
profit in trying to form a rule in the abstract. The district court in Minnesota has said that a defendant cannot keep a plaintiff from dismissing just
because defendant has discovery proceedings pending and would lose his
right to discovery if the action were brought in the state court.8 '
The Federal Rules set the pattern from which the Proposed Wyoming
Rules were cut, and from that fact comes the chief value in a discussion of
this sort. The Proposed Rules differ only in that the provision of 41 (a)
(2) permitting the court no discretion in dismissing when a counterclaim
is pleaded which cannot remain pending for independent adjudication is
omitted. This proviso was not necessary for it was designed to solve a
problem which could only come up in a federal court. Without it a plaintiff with a claim within the jurisdiction of the federal courts could dismiss
and deprive the court of jurisdiction over a counterclaim that did not have
within itself grounds for federal jurisdiction.
To review the difference between the Code and the Proposed Rules
is to point out the advantages of the later. At present plaintiff can drop
out at any time whether or not that inconveniences the defendant and the
court. If controlled by rule 41 (a), the absolute right to dismiss exists only
until an answer has been filed; thereafter there is no inflexible rule but
one which is applied by the court to fit the circumstances in arriving at a
fair answer to the problem of conflicting rights. - Under our present code
the plaintiff may dismiss any number of times while the rules limit him
to one unless the defendant agrees to second without prejudice. Plaintiff
may now dismiss regardless of the cost he imposes on the defendant at
each attempt without having to pay these expenses, but a court guided by
the Rules would be authorized, and in most cases compelled, to make him
pay costs to the defendant.
R. S.

STURGES

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WYOMING'S OIL AND GAS
COMPULSORY POOLING PROVISION
Lack of understanding of the nature of oil and gas in the early history
of its production has led to some seemingly difficult propositions in reconciling common law property concepts with conservation and regulation
of the production of oil and gas. The old rule of capture laid down in
19071 that the owner of a tract could drill as many wells wherever he
wished without regard to others and the consequent competitive drilling
resulted in such waste and expense that need for some regulation became
imperative. Stemming from this need a variety of conservation statutes
31.
1.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1).
Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 A. 801

(1907).

NoTmS
have been enacted in the oil producing states. These statutes include provisions for proration of production, well spacing, pooling, and unitization.
Most recent of these statutes are of two types: one type provides that
a commission may compel two or more separately owned tracts to form a
drilling unit; a unit being the maximum area which can be efficiently and
economically drained by one well. 2 These statutes vary slightly from state
to state. The other type of statute authorizes a commission upon the
request of a certain percentage of interested parties to unitize an entire
producing area or pool embracing a common source of supply for the
purposes of secondary recovery of the oil and gas within a particular pool. 3
Most states having the first of these two types of statutes permit voluntary
unitization agreements for the entire pool for purposes of secondary recovery and specifically exempt them from the effect of anti-trust laws.
Wyoming's statute passed in 1951 is of the first type. It provides for
the creation of an Oil and Gas Conservation Commission comprised of4
the Governor, Commissioner of Public Lands, and the State Geologist.
This Commission has authority to establish drilling units throughout any
given pool.5 The acreage and shape of the unit is determined from evidence presented at a hearing but shall not be smaller than the maximum
area that can be drained by one well. 6 No more than one well shall be
drilled on any one unit.7 When two or more separately owned tracts or
separately owned interests are involved in the same unit the persons
owning such interests may pool their interests for the development and
operation of the unit. "In the absence of voluntary pooling, the commission, upon application of any interested person, may enter an order
pooling all interests in the drilling unit for the development and operation thereof."8 Provision is also made for notice and hearing and for a
proportional distribution of production according to the various interests
involved. The scope of this article is limited to a discussion of the constitutionality of this compulsory pooling provision.
States having this type statute are: Arizona, Ariz. Laws 1951, c. 123, sec. 6; Ariz.
Code P. Supp. 1951, 11-1706; Arkansas, Ark. Acts 1951, No. 134; Alabama, Ala.
Laws 1945, p. 8, sec. 12; Colorado, Colo. Laws 1951, c. 230, H.B. 347; Georgia, Ga.
Code Ann. sec. 43-117, Supp. 1947; Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann., sec. 377.28 (Supp. 1947);
Laws 1951, p. 1500, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 104, sec. 83; Indiana, Ind. Laws
Illinois, 111.
1951, c. 137, sec. 5; Rev. Stat. 1951 Supp., sec. 46-1714; Louisana, La. S.A. Re. Stat.
Tit. 30, secs. 9-10; Michigan, Mich. Pub. Laws (1939) No. 61, Mich. Comp. Stat.
319.70; Mississippi, Miss. Stat. 6132-22 (40 acre maximum); New Mexico, N.M.
Stat., sec. 69-213; North Carolina, N.C. Stat., sec. 113-392 to 113-393; Washington,
Wash. Laws 1951, c. 146, sec. 26; Wyoming, Session Laws of Wyo. 1951, c. 94, sec.
3, Wyo. Comp. Stat., secs. 57-1111 to 57-1122.
3. Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. c. 3 sec. 286.1 to 286.17 (1945); Amended, Okla. Laws
1951, S.B. No. 203 Approved May 26, 1951 The Federal Government has a statute
providing for compulsory unitization of public domain and federally acquired lands,
30 US.C. 226 P. Supp. 1947.
4. Session Laws of Wyo. 1951, c. 94, sec. 12(a), Wyo. Comp. Stat., secs. 57-1111 to
57-1122.
5. Ibid., sec. 3(a), Wyo. Comp. Stat., sec. 57-1113 (a).
6. Ibid., sec. 3(b), Wyo. Comp Stat., sec. 57-1113(b).
7. Ibid., sec. 3(c), Wyo. Comp. Stat., sec. 57-1113(c).
8. Ibid., sec. 3(f), Wyo. Comp. Stat., sec. 57-1113(f).
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Two propositions warrant consideration. First, where all the owners
within the unit are desireous of drilling, but each wishes to drill upon his
own tract, can the Commission constitutionally compel these separate ownners to join into units in the interest of conservation of the oil and gas?
Second, suppose any owner of a particular tract, for reasons best known
to himself, does not want to develop his tract at the present time, can be
constitutionally be compelled against his will to join with others in the
proposed unit in its development?
Possible avenues of attack upon such a statute are that this is a taking
of property without due process of law, 9 an impairment of the obligation
of contracts, 10 an unlawful delegation of power to the commission by the
legislature," a denial of equal protection of the laws, 12 that such regulation interferes with interstate commerce,' 3 and that it is void for want of
definiteness. 14 The statute, if justifiable at all must come under the police
power of the state.' 3 The tests for the proper exercise of police power
placed against constitutional guarantees are, briefly, that the statute must
not be arbitrary or unreasonable, and the regulation must have a direct,
substantial and reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose.' 7
By way of analogy in support of the first proposition, the Wyoming
Supreme Court held that a statute creating a board of control with power
to supervise water in the state did not violate the due process clause. The
court said, "...
All property is held subject to such restraints and regulations as the state may constitutionally make in the exercise of the police
power."' 8 Other statutes have reached similar results. A statute creating
a corporate drainage district was held not an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority.' 9 Another statute creating a water storage district
for storage, conservation and distribution of water for irrigation with
power in a board to describe boundaries, areas and number of persons in
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments U.S. Constitution; Art. I, Sec. 6 and 7, Const.
of Wyo.
Art. I, Sec. 10, U.S. Const.; Art. I, Sec. 35, Const. of Wyo.
Art. 1, Sec 8, Par. 18, U.S. Const.; Art III, Sec. 37, Const. of Wyo.; Art. XV, Sec. 14,
Const. of Wyo.
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments U.S. Const.; Art. I, Sec. 3, Const. of Wyo.
Art. IX, Sec. 10, U.S. Const.
Smith v.Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 LEd. 1264 (1931); Chicago V.
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 275 111. 30, 113 N.E. 849 (1916); Patterson v. Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376, 59 S.Ct. 259, 83 L.Ed. 231 (1939).
C. B. & Q. Ry. v. Ill., 200 U.S. 561, 26 S.Ct. 341, 50 L.Ed. 596 (1906); Gorich v. Fox,

274 U.S. 603, 47 S.Ct. 675, 71 L.Ed. 1228 (1927); Zahn v. Board of Public Works,

16.
17.
18.
19.

274 U.S. 325, 47 S.Ct. 594, 71 L.Ed. 1074 (1927) ; Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137,
33 S.Ct. 76, 57 L.Ed. 156 (1912); Nebbia v. N.Y., 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78
L.Ed. 940 (1934); State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938); Art. X, Sec. 3,
Const. of Wyo.
Gorich v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 47 S.Ct. 675, 71 L.Ed. 1228 (1927); Zahn v. Board of
Public Works, 274 U.S. 325, 47 S.Ct. 594, 71 L.Ed. 1074 (1927); Eubank v. Richmond,
226 U.S. 137, 33 S.Ct. 76, 57 L.Ed. 156 (1912).
State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767; Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 207 U.S. 402,
46 S.Ct. 320, 70 L.Ed. 654 (1926).
Hamp v. State, 19 Wyo. 377, 118 Pac. 653 (1911).
State ex rel. Spencer Co. Atty. v. Drainage District No. 1 of Lynn Co., 123 Kan. 191,
254 Pac. 372 (1927).

NOTES

sub-districts was held not to be a violation of the due process clause, nor
2
was it undue delegation of legislative power. 0
The police power is designated to protect one owner against undue
and unreasonable use of property by another. 2 ' When property in which
several persons have a common interest cannot be fully and benefically
enjoyed in its existing condition, the law often provides a way in which
they may compel one another to submit to measures necessary to secure
its beneficial enjoyment, making equitable compensation to any whose
control or interest in the property is thereby modified.2 2 Contract and
property rights have been held subject to the fair exercise of police power. 23
We are not limited to analogies. In the field of oil and gas law ample
authority exists for upholding the constitutionality of such conservation
statutes. As early as 1900 the right of a state to regulate the drilling of
wells for oil and gas to conserve the rights of adjoining owners was established. 24 Since that time the courts have upheld oil and gas conservation
27
28
25
statutes providing for proration, , gas waste prevention, well spacing,
28
A number of cases have held that the natural reservoir
and pooling.
energy, regardless of its character, rightly belongs to the whole pool, and
conservation statutes to protect this energy are a valid exercise of the
police power. 29 Specific cases hold that oil and gas conservation statutes
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

Tarpey v. McClure, 190 Cal. 593, 213 Pac. 983 (1923).
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1872); Zahn v. Board of Public
Works, 274 U.S. 325, 47 S.Ct. 594, 71 L.Ed. 1074 (1927); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135, 41 S.Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865 (1921); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm., 286 U.S.
210, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932).
Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 5 S.Ct. 441, 28 L.Ed. 889 (1885); Wurts v.
Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606, 5 S.Ct. 1086, 29 L.Ed. 229 (1884); Fallbrook Irrig. Dist.
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 17 S.Ct. 56, 41 L.Ed. 369 (1896).
Manegault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 437, 26 S.Ct. 110, 50 L.Ed. 261 (1905); Home Bldg.
& Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 234, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934); Treigh v.
Acme Homestead Assn., 297 U.S. 189, 56 S.Ct. 387, 80 L.Ed. 581 (1936).
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S.Ct. 576, 44 L.Ed. 729 (1900); Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911).
R.R. Comm. v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 60 S.Ct. 1021, 84 L.Ed.
1368 (1940); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm., 286 U.S. 210, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76
L.Ed. 1062 (1932) ; Corzelleus v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945) ; but see
Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 57 S.Ct. 364, 81 L.Ed. 510
(1937) proration order not upheld.
Ohio Oil Co. v. Ind., 177 U.S. 190, 20 S.Ct. 576, 44 L.Ed. 729 (1900); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 41 S.Ct. 118, 65 L.Ed. 276 (1920); Bandini Petrol Co.
v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8, 52 S.Ct. 103, 76 L.Ed. 136 (1931); People v. Assoc.
Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93, 294 Pac. 717 (1930).
Buford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1934); Oxford
Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil Prod. Co., 22 F.2d 597 (1927); certiorari denied 277 U.S.
585, 48 S.Ct. 432, 72 L.Ed. 1000 (1928); Brown v. Humble Oil and Ref. Co., 126
But see Bernstein v. Bush, 29 Cal.2d 773, 177 P.2d
Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935).
913 (1947) well spacing statute held invalid.
Hunter Co. Inc. v. McHugh, 320 U.S. 222, 64 S.Ct. 19, 88 L.Ed. 5 (1945); Mars v.
City of Oxford, 32 F.2d 134, certiorari denied 280 U.S. 573, 50 S.Ct. 29, 74 L.Ed. 625
(1929); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376, 59 S.Ct. 259, 83 L.Ed.
231 (1939); Croxton v. State, 186 Okla. 249, 97 P.2d 11 (1939).
Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 41 S.Ct. 118, 65 L.Ed. 276 (1920);
Bandini Petrol Co. v. Superior Ct., 284 US. 8, 52 S.Ct. 103, 76 L.Ed. 136 (1931);
Champlin Ref. Co; v. Corp. Comm., 286 U.S. 210, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932) ;
Lindsly v. Assoc Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93, 294 Pac. 717; Quinten Ref. Oil and Gas Co.
v. Corp. Comm., 101 Okla. 164, 224 Pac. 156 (1924); Julian Oil and Royalty Co.
v. Capshaw, 145 Okla. 237, 292 Pac. 841 (1930) ; Russel Petrol Co. v. Walker, 159 Okla.
156, 15 P.2d 114 (1932); Peterson v. Grayce Oil Co., (Tex.) 37 S.W.2d 367 (1931).
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are not a violation of due process,3 0 nor do they constitute impairment of
obligation of contracts.8 1 The creation of a commission to administer
32
the statute is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power,
nor do they violate the equal protection clause so long as everyone of the
same class, i.e all lessors, lessees, or royalty holders, is treated alike,33 nor
34
does regulation under these statutes interfere with interstate commerce.
A similar statute was held not to be so indefinite that it was invalid even
though it left broad discretion with the commission since the commission
was best informed with the technical information necessary to determine
the size and shape of units.85
As to the second proposition, suppose that any particular owner, for
reasons best known to himself, does not want to drill at the present
time. Can he be compelled against his will to join into a unit without
invading his constitutional rights? He may argue that the basis for such
statutes is for purposes of conservation and that he is conserving the
natural resources by leaving them in their natural deposit. The courts
have held that an unwilling landowner may be compelled upon proceedings of some of the proprietors of lands to contribute to the expense
of draining the land as a just and constitutional exercise of the power of
the legislature to establish regulation by which adjoining lands held by
various owners severally and in the improvement of which all have a common interest, but which, by reason of the peculiar natural condition of
the whole tract cannot be improved or enjoyed by them without the concurrance of all, may be reclaimed and made useful to all at their joint
expense.3 0 The same is true of an ordinance which compels an unwilling
37
property holder to contribute to paving the street abutting his property.
The police power not only includes regulation to promote public health,
good morals, and good order but also the right to legislate to promote
30.
31.

32.

33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil Prod. Co., 16 F.2d 639 (1927); certiorari denied 277
U.S. 585, 48 S.Ct. 432, 72 L.Ed. 1000 (1928) ; Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petrol Co.,
-Okla.-,
231 P.2d 997 (1951).
Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 41 S.Ct. 118, 65 L.Ed. 276 (1920);
Oxford Oil Co. v. At. Oil Prod..Co., 22 F.2d 597 (1927); certiorari denied, 277 U.S.
585, 48 S.Ct. 432 (1928); People v. Assoc. Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93, 294 Pac. 717 (1930);
Crichton v. Lee, 209 La. 561, 25 So.2d 229 (1946); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil &
Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376, 59 S.Ct. 259, 83 L.Ed.. 231 (1939); Palmer Oil Corp. v.
Phillips Petrol. Co., -- Okla.-, 231 P.2d 997 (1951).
Bandini Perol. Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8, 52 S.Ct. 103, 76 L.Ed. 136 (1931);
Oxford Oil Co. v. Atl. Oil Prod. Co., 22 F.2d 597 (1927); certorari denied, 277
U.S. 585, 48 S.Ct. 432, 72 L.Ed. 1000 (1928); People v. Assoc. Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93,
294 Pac. 717 (1930); Hunter Oil Co. v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So.2d 495 (1942);
Patterson v. Stanollind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376, 59 S.Ct. 259, 83 L.Ed. 231 (1939);
231 P.2d 997 (1951).
Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., -Okla.-,
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm., 286 U.S. 210, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932);
Walls v Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 41 S.Ct. 118, 65 L.Ed. 276 (1920);
Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. R.R. Comm., 49 S.W.2d 837 (1932); Hunter Oil Co. v.
McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So.2d 495 (1932).
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm., 286 US. 210, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932);
Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. R.R. Comm., 49 S.W.2d 837 (1932).
Chrichton v. Lee, 209 La. 561, 25 So.2d 229 (1946).
Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606, 5 S.Ct. 1086, 29 L.Ed. 229 (1884); Head v. Omskeag
Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 194 U.S. 168, 24 S.Ct. 784, 48 L.Ed. 1142 (1904).
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development of industry and utilization of natural resources38 in order
to add to the wealth and prosperity of the state.3 9 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court recently held valid a statute which provided that upon petition of
fifty per cent of the lessees up to fifteen per cent of the other lessees over a
given pool or common source of supply could be compelled against their
consent to join in the unitization and operation of the entire area. 40
The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that the state under
the police power may regulate the production of oil and gas for purposes
of conservation. If as a reasonable conservation measure and in the interest
of protecting the correlative rights of the landowners the state feels it
necessary to unitize the entire common source of supply or any part thereof
and develop the same as a single unit this is within the valid exercise of
the police power even against the opposition of an unwilling landowner.
One criticism might be offered-that is, why did Wyoming not adopt
a satute similar to Oklahoma's which takes a step beyond merely creating
a unit for one well for conservation of oil and gas during the primary production stage, but unitizes the whole pool for the sake of secondary recovery. If conservation is the real objective it can be best accomplished
under such a statute as Oklahoma's. Engineers have long agreed that from
fifty to over ninety per cent more oil and gas could be recovered by working the whole common source of supply as a single unit without paying
atention to surface boundaries, or from which particular hole the oil
and gas from the pool is brought to the surface.
If the old concepts of property that the owner of the surface owned
everything vertically above and below the surface were abandoned with
regard to oil and gas, and a concept that the surface owners had an undivided interest in the whole pool in proportion to the surface owned over
the particular pool were adopted, this would not do violence to established
constitutional guarantees. This latter concept seems more realistic in the
light of our present understanding of the characteristics of oil and gas.
Engineers have long agreed that the natural pressure and oil and gas
belong to the whole pool. 41 These pressures cannot be separated and confined into nice parcels as can the surface and other minerals. Oil and
gas rights are severable for other purposes; therefore, why not sever them
in such a way that the surface owners have an undivided interest in the
whole pool in proportion to the surface owned over the particular pool.
38.
39.
40.

41.

Barbier v. Connoly, 113 U.S. 27, 5 S.Ct. 357, 28 L.Ed. 923 (1885); Quenton Relieve
Oil & Gas Co. v. Corp. Comm., 101 Okla. 164, 224 Pac. 156 (1924); Julian Oil &
Royalty Co. v. Capshaw, 145 Okla. 237, 292 Pac. 841 (1930).
C. B. & Q. Ry. v. Ill., 200 U.S. 561, 26 S.Ct. 341, 50 L.Ed. 596 (1906).
Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petrol Co., -- Okla.,-, 231 P.2d 997 (1951).
The
statute has since been amended changing the number of petitioners to 63% of the
lessees, and omitting the provision which gave the right to 15% of the lessees to
nulify the order. Since this amendment 63% of the landowners over the pool can
compel 37% to unitize and develop their lands against their will. Okla. Laws 1951,
S.B. No. 203. Approved May 26, 1951.

Secondary Recovery of Oil in the United States, Am. Petrol. Institute, Glossary of
Terms and Definitions, p. 255; Petroleum Engineer, Nov. 1948, p. 530.
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This proposition immediately poses many problems beyond the scope of
this article, but it is apparently the best solution to date of conserving
present oil and gas resources.
MElVIN

M.

FILLERUP

QUITCLAIM HOLDER AS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER
On the question whether one claiming under a quitclaim is entitled
to the protection of the recording acts there is a wide range of authority.
Text writers have divided the authorities into so-called majority and
minority rules, with the majority giving the quitclaim grantee the protection of the recording acts.' Also the majority view is gaining favor constantly, the minority rule denying such protection being an outdated
viewpiont.2 However, beneath the facade of majority and minority labels,
there appears to be a large number of subsidiary rules, with no such
clear-cut differences as would seem indicated. This article will attempt
to point out the barely discernible basic reasoning behind the welter of
conflicting rules.
A theory which can be disposed of initially is one finding that presence
or lack of warranties in a deed has bearing upon the problem, whether
we shall recognize the good faith of a quitclaim holder by granting him
protection against outstanding unrecorded interests. The difference in
warranties is, of course, a basic distinction between quitclaim and warranty
deeds, so it seems that many courts feel constrained to mention it, either
to point out that lack of warranties indicates outstanding claims, or to
minimize their importance in that connection. Indeed, some courts have
been so worried about the warranty argument that an ingenious one has
been thought up in rebuttal, to the effect that a purchaser requiring warranties for his protection must have a greater doubt as to the validity of
his grantor's title.3 In practice, however, even those courts which deny
protection to a quitclaim holder will give protection to a holder of a deed
of bargain and sale without warranties. 4 Therefore, as the warranty
argument, though often mentioned, is never relied upon as the true basis
for the distinctions made between quitclaims and other deeds, its elimination in the following discussion should not be too great a loss.
The real basis for the distinction made by the minority is the wellsettled concept that a quitclaim deed purports to convey only such right,
title or interest as the grantor has at the time the deed is made.5 The
1.
2'
3.
4.

5.

55 Am. Jur. 1112.
Compare note, 105 Am. St. Rep. 854 (1903), and annotation, 59 A.L.R. 632 (1927).
Babcock v. Wells, 25 R.I. 23, 54 A. 596, 105 Am. St. Rep. 848 (1903).
Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454, 26 Am. Rep. 304 (1887); American Mortg. Co. v.
Hutchinson, 19 Ore. 334, 24 Pac. 515 (1890); Smith v. Branch Bank, 21 Ala. 125
(1852); Pierson v. Bill, 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939); Southern Ry. v. Carroll,
86 S. C. 56, 67 S.E. 4, 138 A.S.R. 1017 (1910).
16 Am. Jur. 624; 8 Thompson, Real Property, sec. 4301 (perm. ed. 1940).

